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ABSTRACT 
This study examines the extent to which religious socials norms of the firms’ environment 
interacts with corporate governance and BIG4 audit to affect managers’ motivation to engage 
in misclassification so as to influence reported core earnings. Using a sample of 23,164 U.S. 
firm-year observations between 2000 and 2015, we show that religiosity complements 
corporate governance to mitigate classification shifting in both rural and urban areas. In a 
religious environment, we find that managers have disincentive to shift revenue items from and 
core expenses into special items to inflate reported core earnings to avoid market penalties and 
beat analyst forecast, even more so in the presence of board independence. In addition, we find 
that the interaction between religiosity and audit from big four auditors also lower the presence 
of misclassification. Overall, results show that religiosity complements corporate governance 
and audit against misclassifying revenue items or core expenses.  
 
 
Keywords: Religiosity, Classification Shifting, Corporate Governance, BIG4 and Audit 
Tenure.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 3 
1. INTRODUCTION  
The objective of this study is to provide an empirical assessment of the extent to which religious 
social norms of the firms' environment interacts with corporate governance and BIG4 audit to 
affect misclassification of income-decreasing special items or special revenue items to 
influence reported core earnings. The study fills the gap in the literature on managers’ 
opportunistic misclassification of revenue and/or expense items in a religious social norm 
environment. It is important to ascertain whether religious social norms of the firms’ 
environment mitigate managers’ opportunistic behaviour or economic motivations in 
classification shifting. By economic, the study suggests that religious social norms might 
influence misclassification of special items in order to signal and help users to understand the 
firms’ underlying financial performance in line with prior research (Francis, Hanna and 
Vincent, 1996; Lougee and Marquardt 2004; Bowen, Davis and Matsumoto, 2005). By 
opportunistic behaviour, the study holds a view similar to prior studies (McVay, 2006; Fan et 
al. 2010) that misclassifying core expenses or revenue items into special items aims at 
influencing perceptions of the firms’ performance in a biased way. Prior research indicates that 
highly religious individuals tend to hold conservative views and high moral standards than 
individuals with lower religious background (Terpstra, Rozell and Robinson, 1993; Barnett, 
Jermier and Lafferty, 1996). Following these studies, Conroy and Emerson (2004) examine the 
association between religiosity and financial reporting and find that religiosity is negatively 
related to the use of accounting manipulation. Kennedy and Lawton (1998) observe that the 
higher the degree of religious social norms in an environment, the stronger its effect on people 
who live and operate in that environment. On another strand of the literature (Terpstra et al. 
1993; Barnett et al., 1996; Weaver and Agle, 2002; Conroy and Emerson, 2004; Longenecker, 
McKinney and Moore, 2004) provides evidence of the impact of religiosity on business ethics. 
For example, Weaver and Agle (2002) observe that business ethics is positively related to 
religiosity especially when religion is an important part of individual’s self-identity. Similarly, 
Welch, Tittle and Petee (1991) note that the prominence attached to religious social norms in 
an environment has a great impact on individual’s devotion to social norms, attitudes and 
beliefs. Thus managers’ behaviour is shaped by the religious social norms of the population in 
the neighbourhood that surrounds them.  
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We extend research in the area of classification shifting to examine whether religious social 
norms in the firms’ environment influence misclassification of core expenses and/or revenue 
to influence market perceptions, influence share price or beat analysts’ benchmarks. Prior 
research document evidence of misclassification in expense items and demonstrates that 
managers opportunistically shift core expenses (cost of goods sold and selling, general and 
administrative expenses) to special items (Zalata and Roberts, 2015; Behn, Gotti, Hermann and 
Kang, 2013; Haw, Ho and Li, 2011, Fan, Barua, Cready and Thomas, 2010 and McVay, 2006), 
misclassify expenses in discontinued operations as operating expenses (Barua, Lin and 
Sbaraglia, 2010) and shift extraordinary items into operating expense (Barnea, Ronen and 
Sadan, 1976) to inflate core earnings. Again, several factors have been noted to mitigate 
classification shifting, for example; good internal corporate governance (Zalata and Roberts, 
2015; Veprauskaite and Adams, 2013; Xie, Davidson, & DaDalt, 2003), monitoring role by 
financial analyst (Behn et al., 2013) and strong investor protection (Haw et al., 2011).  
 
The objective of this study is to examine the impact of religious social norms on managers’ 
motivation to manage core earnings using core expenses or revenue items in classification 
shifting. First, we use McVay (2006) expectation model to assess the existence of classification 
shifting and the impact of religiosity on classification shifting in the U.S. Secondly, we agree 
with the concerns raised by Fan et al. (2010) to exclude contemporaneous accruals from the 
original McVay (2006) model. Thirdly, we replace total accruals by working capital accruals 
(which exclude depreciation expense and other exceptional items) to avoid any bias associated 
with original McVay’s (2006) model as reported by Athanasakou, Strong & Water (2009). In 
addition, we break our data into rural and urban areas, high and low religious areas in order to 
assess the effect of religious social norms on classification shifting.   
Thereafter, we include interaction terms between religiosity and corporate governance 
variables, religiosity and audit tenure as well as religiosity and BIG4 auditors in line with Zalata 
and Roberts (2015) using McVay (2006) model to re-assess the impact of religiosity on 
classification shifting. We respond to the call by Callen et al., (2011) and McGuire et al., (2012) 
to examine the extent to which religion affects earnings management on a broader scale by 
exploring the association between religiosity and misclassification of revenue items from and 
core expenses into special items. Again, we focus on all U.S. states and use all U.S. county 
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level religious dataset from The Association of Religious Data Archives (ARDA) database and 
all US firms in the Compustat database. Overall, we identify 698 distinctive counties that are 
the headquarters of at least one of the firms on the Compustat annual database used in our 
analyses. We collect financial data from all firms on the Compustat database between 2000 and 
2015.  
From the analyses, we observe a significant negative association between religious social 
norms and classification shifting. The results suggest that religiosity mitigates managers’ 
incentive to classification shifting. Thus, managers in a highly religious environment have no 
motivation to misclassify core expenses into special items or shift revenue items to meet capital 
market pressures or earnings targets. We also observe that religiosity is negatively related to 
classification shifting in firms located in both rural and urban areas in the light of the low (high) 
earnings quality often associated with urban (rural) firms respectively. In further analyses, we 
study the interaction between religiosity and corporate governance, audit tenure, BIG4 auditors 
and find that in a religious social norms environment, the effect of corporate governance, audit 
tenure and BIG4 auditor is more pronounced and negatively significant. Thus, religiosity 
complements corporate governance, audit tenure and BIG4 auditors to mitigate managers’ 
incentive to misclassify revenue items or core expenses to inflate reported core earnings.  
The study makes three important contributions. First, we examine whether religiosity is 
associated with income-decreasing special items or special revenue classification shifting. 
Second, we assess whether classification shifting occurs in both rural and urban areas despite 
the high earnings quality often associated with rural areas. In addition, we investigate whether 
corporate governance, audit tenure and BIG4 auditors mitigate classification shifting in firms' 
operating in highly religious environment. Finally, we provide different evidence of the 
interaction between religiosity and corporate governance variables, such as board size, board 
independence, audit committee, audit tenure and BIG4 auditors. The evidence shows that 
religiosity is negative and significantly associated with classification shifting. In addition, the 
study shows that religiosity impacts upon firms in rural and urban areas, and that religiosity 
serves as a monitoring mechanism to complement existing governance structure and external 
monitoring put in place by management. 
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The rest of the study is organised as follows. In section 2, we discuss the literature and develop 
the hypotheses. Section 3 covers research design, empirical methodology and estimation 
equations. Section 4 discusses data collection, sampling and descriptive statistics. The 
regression results are discussed in section 5. In addition, section 6 presents results of robustness 
tests and further sensitivity analyses. Section 7 provides conclusion and future research. 
2. HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
 
2.19 Religious Social Norm 
 
From the view point of social norm theory, managers of firms operating in religious 
environment with diverse social norms exhibit varied behaviours (Tayler and Bloomfield, 
2010). In fact, individuals’ decisions are shaped by the moral values and social norms of the 
environment where they live or work. The resilience of religious social norms has posed great 
surprises in recent decades (Renneboog and Spaenjers, 2011; Hilary and Hui, 2009). For 
instance, prior research has established the relationship between religion and personal 
behaviour (Lehrer, 2004, p. 180), religion and development (Mersland, D’Espallier and 
Supphellen, 2012; Ter Haar & Ellis, 2006), religion, economic attitudes and household income 
(Renneboog and Spaenjers, 2011).  
Previous researchers have also indicated that religion affects individuals’ behaviour and that 
religiosity enhances individual’s ethical values and attitudes (Tayler and Bloomfield, 2010; 
Vitell, 2009; Parboteeah, Hoegl and Cullen, 2008). This view is also corroborated by Shu, 
Sulaeman and Yeung (2012) who find that individual’s level of religiosity is positively 
correlated with high ethical values. According to Lehrer (2004), the personal religious values 
such as: discipline (Kennedy and Lawton, 1998), accountable (Iannaccone, 1998), honest 
(Keister, 2003) has the potential to influence the performance of firms and for that matter the 
characteristics of individuals. In a related study, Barro and McCleary (2003) assess the impact 
of religiosity on performance and observe that managers can maintain high levels of success 
and performance irrespective of the demographic and cultural background in which the moral 
values are implemented. Sunder (2005) underscores the importance of religious values to the 
stakeholders of the firm and find that the absence of religiosity can potentially harm 
stakeholders and affect the whole system and performance of the organisation (Omer, Sharp 
and Wang, 2010).  
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2.2 Classification Shifting and Religious Social Norms 
Prior studies document evidence of earnings management using accrual management 
(Donelson, Mcinnis & Mergenthaler, 2013; Gao, 2013; Gerakos and Kovrijnykh, 2013) and 
real-activities management (Kim and Park, 2014; Wongsunwai, 2013; Badertscher, 2011; 
Cohen and Zarowin, 2010; Gunny, 2010; Roychowdhury, 2006; Graham, Harvey & Rajgopal, 
2005). Accruals management has a high cost of detection and involves borrowing earnings 
from future periods either through acceleration of revenues or delaying of expenses. On the 
other hand, real activities have lower cost of detection and involve the provision of discounts 
to boost sales and cutting down of discretionary expenses such as; advertising, research and 
development costs to increase earnings. In fact, previous studies to establish the association 
between religion and earnings management (McGuire et al., 2012; Callen et al., 2011; Dyreng 
et al, 2009) have ignored classification shifting as an earnings management method. McVay 
(2006) indicates that classification shifting re-arranges income statement items and does not 
change the bottom-line reported earnings but involves; classifying operating expenses as 
discontinued operations (Barua et al., 2010), classifying operating expenses as extraordinary 
items (Barnea, Ronen and Sadan, 1976), classifying operating expenses as special items (Fan 
et al., 2010; McVay, 2006) and classifying other operating income as special items (Noh et al, 
2014).  Indeed, establishing the link between individuals’ religious values and economic 
development has been extensively covered in the economics literature but the link between 
religion and classification shifting is missing in the accounting literature. We investigate this 
gap in the earnings management literature.1 Zalata and Robert, (2015); Fan et al., (2010) and 
McVay, (2006) indicate that whilst the various methods of earnings management raise 
expectations of future performance, both real-activities and accrual-based earnings 
management have the effect of reducing future or past earnings. Consequently, the reputation 
and the quality of the company are compromised (Cao, Myers and Omer, 2012). With income-
decreasing classification shifting, McVay (2006) indicates that there is no change in reported 
bottom-line earnings; rather core earnings are inflated as recurring items are shifted to non-
recurring and exceptional items leading to a positive relationship between core earnings and 
                                                          
1 Classification shifting does not involve GAAP violation; auditors and regulators do not scrutinize classification shifting as they do for 
accrual-based and real-activities earnings management (Fan et al., 2010; McVay, 2006). 
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special items (Behn et al., 2013). There is no implication for future reported earnings (Barua et 
al., 2010), therefore, there is limited external monitoring and vigilance (Nelson et al., 2002).  
On ethical grounds, previous studies (McGuire et al., 2012; Dryeng et al., 2010; Grullen et al., 
2010) indicate that religiosity influences earnings management and curbs financial reporting 
irregularities. For example, Callen et al., (2011) find no relationship between religious social 
norms of the firms’ environment and earnings management. However, McGuire et al., (2012) 
and Dyreng et al., (2010) report a negative association between religiosity and accrual-based 
earnings management but positive relationship between real-activities based earnings 
management and religiosity. However, Scott (1995) argues that earnings management can be 
beneficial by signalling managers’ inside information to investors. From the discussions above, 
we posit that religiosity in a firm’s environment can complement existing monitoring 
mechanism put in place by management to mitigate classification shifting practices or it’s 
probable that managers in areas with strong religious backgrounds would misclassify core 
expenses into special items to increase reported core earnings to signal managers inside 
information to investors. The above arguments therefore lead to the following hypothesis:  
H1a Classification shifting using income-decreasing special items is related to the religiosity 
of the firms’ environment. 
On the other hand, McVay (2006) and Bulkeley (2002) indicate that managers’ might 
misclassify revenue items upward to increase reported core earnings. Prior research (Alfonso, 
Cheng and Pan, 2012; Cheon, 2011) indicate that firms’ operating income covers all items 
except investment income and financial cost when operating income is low. Again, Noh et al 
(2014) investigate whether managers engage in classification shifting using both revenue and 
expenses items. They find that firms’ shift other income to influence reported core earnings 
generally but engage in shifting of core expenses into special items just to meet or beat earnings 
benchmarks. Therefore, it’s probable that firms misclassify revenue items to influence reported 
core earnings. McVay (2006) suggested that future research should consider upward 
classification shifting of revenue itemss. However, prior studies in the business ethics literature 
(Terpstra et al., 1993; Barnett et al., 1996; Weaver and Agle, 2002; Conroy and Emerson, 2004; 
Longenecker et al., 2004) indicate that providing misleading financial information is ethically 
and morally unacceptable. Also, the teachings from the various religious groups forbid mis-
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reporting of financial information. For example, The Holy Bible says 'You shall not steal, nor 
deal falsely, nor lie to one another. 'You shall not swear falsely by My name, bear false witness 
so as to profane the name of your God; I am the LORD (Exodus 20:15; Leviticus 19:11-12). 
Also, the Holy Quran says “It is not for any Prophet to take illegally or falsify a part of booty 
(Ghulul), and whosoever deceives his companions as regards the booty, he shall bring forth on 
the Day of Resurrection that which he took (illegally). Then every person shall be paid in full 
what he has earned, and they shall not be dealt with unjustly” (Surah 161).  In addition, the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) (2000) has expressed serious concern on the 
improper misclassification of line items on the income statement, especially revenue items. 
Therefore, the SEC regulates individual line items on the financial statements. Consequently, 
we investigate whether or not firms in the U.S. are engaged in shifting special revenue items 
to boost total revenue or reported core earnings. Secondly, we examine the impact of religiosity 
in the firms’ environment on upward misclassification of special revenue. Following the above 
discussions, the study examines whether managers in a religious social norm environment, 
might or might not be involved in opportunistic or economic misclassification of special 
revenue items to lower the expectation of the market, hide certain internal information from 
shareholders, mislead investors and financial analyst. The hypothesis that follows is stated 
below: 
H1b: Classification shifting using special revenue items is related to the religiosity of the firms’ 
environment. 
2.2 Classification Shifting, Religiosity and Corporate Governance 
A sound corporate governance mechanism requires superior board independence, autonomous 
audit committees and separation of the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and the chairman roles 
(Kim, Mauldin and Patro, 2014; Gonzalez and Garcia-Meca, 2014; Jo and Harjoto, 2011). 
Interestingly, previous research on corporate governance has concentrated on characteristics of 
corporate governance including; board structure and independence; ownership structure and 
influence; financial transparency and disclosure, as well as financial stakeholders rights and 
relations on performance, shareholder value, financial reporting (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2006; 
Cullen and Christopher, 2002). Also, Chau and Gary (2010) examine the relationship between 
managerial ownership and financial reporting and find that managerial ownership is negatively 
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associated with the levels of voluntary financial disclosure. Prior research indicates that 
corporate governance in the area of public ownership allows large number of investors to press 
for full disclosure and quality financial reporting from management (Chau and Gray, 2002; 
Cullen and Christopher, 2002). Publicly owned companies have more shareholders and 
therefore are expected to exert more pressure on the board for more disclosure and extra 
information as a result of accountability issues.  
However, studies (Kim et al. 2014; Uddin and Choudhury, 2008) indicate that several 
shareholders in publicly owned companies do not understand the financial reports presented at 
the annual general meeting (AGM) and therefore cannot influence the financial reporting 
quality. In addition, board independence is regarded as a key corporate governance mechanism 
that affects financial reporting quality because they are expected to make decisions that protect 
the interest of shareholders. Therefore, research indicates that financial reporting quality is 
positively associated with board independence, estimated as the number of independent 
directors on the board. In a related study, Li and Srinivasan (2011) observe that monitoring 
quality and financial reporting are enhanced when the roles of CEO and chairman are separated. 
Prior studies (Kim et al. 2014; Jo and Harjoto, 2011) state that separating the two roles 
strengthens the corporate governance mechanism and internal control system for effective 
financial reporting and performance management but they were quick to observe that several 
companies that have capable and effective boards are managed by individuals with a 
combination of CEO and chairman positions. In fact, a key influence on corporate governance 
mechanism is the presence of audit committees in an organisation (Turley and Zaman, 2004, 
2007). Audit committee has the responsibility of ensuring effective internal control procedures, 
approving the choice of accounting policies, influencing the financial reporting and disclosure 
quality within an organisation. Li and Srinivasan (2011) indicate that there is a positive 
association between audit committee and financial reporting quality.  
Prior studies (Agrawal and Chadha, 2005; Klein, 2002) observe that earnings management or 
restatements decrease when independent directors with banking experience or professional 
accounting background are on the audit committee. Previous research has also indicated a 
positive association between the market reaction and an appointment of a board member with 
an accounting background to the firm’s audit committee (Davidson and Stevens 2010). This 
study observe that the effectiveness of the audit committee is enhanced and the integrity of 
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financial reporting is significantly improved, when there is a presence of financial expert on 
the audit committee. Similarly, where ownership is concentrated in the hands of few 
individuals, these shareholders exert pressure on the board of directors to the detriment of 
external creditors and non-controlling interest. Similarly, where corporate governance system 
allows for an independent scrutiny of managerial decision - making, shareholder value is 
enhanced and all stakeholders benefit (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2006). 
The accounting literature is satiated with studies that discuss the association between corporate 
governance mechanism and financial reporting irregularities (Cohen and Zarowin, 2010; 
Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney, 1996). These studies find that firms’ that are involved in financial 
reporting irregularities have weak corporate governance mechanism. For example, studies 
(Cohen and Zarowin, 2010; Agrawal and Chadha, 2005; Faber, 2005; Abbott et al. 2004) 
observe that firms that have weak audit committees and whose board of directors are controlled 
by inside directors with few external non-executive directors have very weak financial 
reporting system. Importantly, the presence of autonomous audit committees reduces the 
motivation by firms to be involved in fraudulent financial reporting, the misstatement of 
financial reports, rather firms aspire to maintain high accruals quality. Several studies have 
examined the turnover of outside directors (Faber, 2005; Srinivasan, 2005), senior management 
(Li and Srinivasan, 2011) following the detection of financial reporting irregularities and 
accounting restatement. These studies find substantial turnover in boards, top managers and 
financial officers in firms that restate earnings and report financial irregularities.  
Similarly, Zalata and Roberts (2015) observe that high quality internal governance in the board 
and audit committees mitigate classification shifting. Again, (Gonzalez and Garcia-Meca, 
2014; Kim et al., 2014; Haw et al., 2011; Lin and Hwang, 2010; Harris and Raviv, 2008) 
indicate that strong corporate governance acts as a form of monitoring mechanism, controls 
devious managerial behaviour, mitigate classification shifting and reduces information risk. In 
addition, (Hossain, Mitra, Rezaee and Sarath, 2011) observe that the relationship between the 
board size, the number of meetings and accruals management is negative. Also, audit 
committees (Abbott, Parker, Peters and Raghunandan, 2003), number of meetings and financial 
expertise (Coles, Daniel and Naveen (2008), number of outside directors (Chau and Gray, 
2010) and CEO reputation (Francis, Huang, Rajgopal and Zang, 2008) have been found to 
affect financial reporting.  
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Unlike the previous studies discussed above, the current study centres on the interaction 
between corporate governance (defined in this study as presence of audit committee, strong 
board size and independent board) and religiosity of the firms’ environment on classification 
shifting. The extant literature has examined the relationship between corporate governance and 
other aspects of the organisation including; financial statements disclosure or reporting 
(Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2006; Faber, 2005; Srinivasan, 2005; Cullen and Christopher, 2002). 
Recently, several studies have also examined the association between religiosity and financial 
reporting irregularities (McGuire et al. 2012; Callen et al. 2011; Grullon et al. 2010). However, 
there is no study that has examined religion and misclassification as well as the effect of the 
interaction between corporate governance and religiosity on classification shifting in the U.S. 
Therefore, it is probable that the influence of religious social norms on classification shifting 
would be significant or insignificant for firms with good internal corporate governance. On the 
other hand, it could also mean that the influence of religious social norms could complement 
internal corporate governance mechanism in mitigating classification shifting. Following the 
above discussions and in line with prior studies, we use board size, board independence and 
audit committees as our proxies for internal corporate governance mechanism to examine the 
effect of religiosity on classification shifting. The above discussion lead to the following 
hypotheses:  
H2: The interaction between religiosity and audit committee, between religiosity and board 
size as well as religiosity and board independence is related to managers’ classification shifting 
behaviour.   
2.3 Classification Shifting and Religiosity in Rural and Urban Areas 
Loughran and Schultz (2005) and Loughran (2007) observe that reported earnings quality are 
higher in rural areas and rural companies are more likely to report voluntary management 
earnings forecast. Similarly, Ucran (2007) finds that rural firms relative to urban firms provide 
higher quality financial information, better corporate disclosures and better quality reported 
earnings. Conventionally, prior research (McGuire et al., 2012; Ucran, 2007) indicate that those 
who live in rural areas tend to exhibit more traditional views and religiosity than their 
counterparts in the urban areas. Similarly, McGuire et al., (2012) examine religiosity and 
accruals earnings management in rural and urban areas and observe that religiosity mitigates 
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earnings management in rural areas despite higher earnings quality associated with rural areas. 
Ucran (2007) indicate that rural areas are associated with fewer local investors, poorer liquidity 
and low investment leading to higher cost of capital and lower market value. Consequently, 
managers of rural firms provide information to minimise the adverse effects of rural areas. 
Again, prior studies argue that managers of rural firms may provide better corporate disclosures 
to maintain their personal reputation in the society because they interact socially with potential 
investors and other stakeholders. In contrast, in the urban settings, it is possible for managers 
to distance their social life from employees and potential investors (Loughran, 2007; Ucran, 
2007 and Loughran and Schultz, 2005). Therefore, managers of urban firms might be involved 
in classification shifting of special items because they might feel less pressure to main their 
personal reputation. On the other hand, where management in rural firms seek private benefits, 
they might try to engage in misclassification to hide information from the public at the expense 
of shareholders and this is likely to manifest in classification shifting and lower earnings 
quality.  Following the above, it is important to show that our results concerning the impact of 
religious social norms of the firms’ environment on classification shifting are not influenced 
by the high or low earnings quality attributable to firms headquartered in rural or urban areas. 
The above discussion lead to the following hypotheses:     
  
H3: The religiosity in the firms’ headquartered could affect differently managers’ classification 
shifting behaviour in urban areas vs. rural areas. 
 
3.0 DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
3.1 Measuring Religiosity  
We utilise religious dataset published by Religious Congregations and Membership Study 
(RCMS) between 2000 and 2010 to measure the strength of religious social norms. We use 
these datasets to create our proxy for religiosity. The religiosity dataset is derived from 
Association of Statisticians of American Religious Bodies (ASARB). The results of these 
surveys are published on the website of Association of Religion Data Archive (ARDA). The 
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survey consists of an average of 173 religious bodies2 and a total of 248,957 congregations 
with an average of 150,686,156 adherents. This represents 51.9% of the average U.S. 
population during the period between 2000 and 2010. The average percentage of population 
showing religiosity and religious adherents from each U.S. County is 64.4% and respondents 
exceeded 55.9% of the total population from each U.S. County. Religious adherents consist of 
all members, full members, communicants or non- communicants, baptized or non-baptized, 
regular attendants, participants of weekly religious activities and those who consider religion 
as important part of their life.  
 
The data set is then scaled by the total county population as reported by US Census Bureau of 
that same period. Conceptually, the higher the percentage of religious adherents in a county, 
the higher the impact of religious social norm on the firms headquartered in that county. 
Therefore, we use total number of religious adherents per capita in line with prior studies 
(Grullon et al., 2009; Hout and Greely, 1998).  Overall, we identify 698 distinctive counties 
that are the headquarters of at least one of the firms on the Compustat annual database used in 
our analyses between 2000 and 2015. The county-level religiosity scores are matched to their 
respective U.S. States by merging them by year using the state code identifiers from the 
Compustat’s company location code where firms are headquartered to derive the State-level 
religious dataset. We use religious dataset covering all U.S. States. The data requirement for 
each dependent and independent variable is a function of the number of observations and test 
required for the analysis.  
 
Table 1 below provides descriptive statistics for the measure of RELIGIOSITY (REL). Table 
1 shows that religiosity in the U.S. is declining from an average of approximately 53% in 2000 
to an average of 48% in 2010 in each county. This is consistent with the 2008 American 
Religious Identification Survey, which reports a substantial decline in religiosity among US 
population between 1990 and 2008. In addition, Table 1 indicates that approximately 54% of 
all people in each U.S. county are affiliated with a religion, attend a religious activity or 
considers religion as important in their life. 
                                                          
2 Of this, there were on average 154 Christian denominations and associations (including Messianic Jews, Latter-Day Saints, and Universalist 
groups); there were also counts of Shinto, Sikh, Jain, National Spiritualist Association Congregations, and several congregations and adherents 
from three Buddhist groupings, four Hindu groupings, Baha’s, four Jewish groupings, Zoroastrians and Muslims. 
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(Insert Table 1 Here) 
In the robustness tests, we use Gallup religious database for the twenty most and least religious 
US States for the same study period. Based on the responses collected by Gallup, on whether 
religion is important, respondents attend religious activities weekly or are affiliated with 
religion, Mississippi came out, as the most religious state, whilst Vermont is the least religious 
state. The most religious states are mainly in the South, with the exception of Utah, while the 
least religious states are concentrated in New England and the West. 
(Insert Table 2 here) 
 
3.2 Control Variables  
 
In line with prior research (McVay, 2006; Fan et al., 2010), the study includes lagged core 
earnings (𝐶𝐸𝑡−1) because of the unrelenting nature of core earnings. Again, asset turnover ratio 
(𝐴𝑇𝑂𝑡) is added to the model because Nassim and Penman (2001) report that there exists a 
negative relationship between profit margin and 𝐴𝑇𝑂𝑡. In addition, McVay (2006) indicates 
that inclusion of 𝐴𝑇𝑂𝑡 in the model (1) below is crucial because changes to the operating 
strategies are associated with firms that have large income-decreasing special items, for 
example, firms can change their profit and sales mix to affect the level of core earnings. We 
include 𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑈𝐴𝐿𝑆𝑡−1, which are prior year operating accruals and 𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑈𝐴𝐿𝑆𝑡, which are 
current year accruals in the model. Previous studies (Fan et al., 2010; McVay, 2006) observe 
that earnings performance of firms is influenced by accruals and cash flows earnings 
components. These studies observe that accruals manipulation could result in high or low 
accruals figure, which can affect firm’s performance. Therefore, we include accruals to ensure 
a good prediction of core earnings. Again, prior research (McVay, 2006; Baker, Collins and 
Reitenga, 2009) indicates that costs increase is associated with changes in activity level. We 
therefore include the change in sales (∆𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑡) and the percentage change in sales 
(𝑁𝐸𝐺∆𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑡), if ∆𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑡 is less than 0, otherwise zero. In addition, we include firm level 
control variables and control for return on assets (ROA) because prior studies indicate that firm 
performance influences earnings management (Zalata and Roberts, 2015; Cohen et al. 2008; 
McVay, 2006). The poorer the performance of the firm, the keener will be the tendency to 
engage in misclassification of special items to increase reported core earnings. Thus, we 
anticipate a negative coefficient on ROA. Also, we include firm size (SIZE) to control for the 
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existing variations in accruals behaviour between large and small firms. Prior studies 
(Ashbaugh et al., 2003) indicate that small firms are more likely to engage in earnings 
manipulations than large firms. Therefore, depending on the size of the firms in the sample, we 
expect a negative or positive association between classification shifting and SIZE. To secure 
external financing, prior studies indicate that management might manage reported earnings 
upwards. Therefore, we control for leverage (LEV), estimated as the ratio of long-term debt to 
total assets because prior studies indicate that managing earnings upwards allows firms to meet 
debts covenants (Zhang, 2008; Badertscher, 2011). In addition, Daniel et al. (2008) report that 
firms with a leverage have the tendency to manage earnings because of debts covenants, 
therefore a positive relationship between LEV and unexpected core earnings is expected. 
3.3 Data Collection 
We collect financial data from the annual compustat database between 2000 and 2015. We also 
obtain additional data from other sources including, Annual Reports, Audit Analytics, CRSP 
and I/B/E/S. Firms with missing data and those with less than 15 firm-year observations to test 
our hypotheses and estimate expected core earnings are excluded in line with prior research 
(Haw et al., 2011; Fan et al., 2010; McVay, 2006). In addition, to shun bias and avoid creation 
of outliers resulting from the inclusion of insignificant firms in the sample, we exclude any 
observation with sales revenue less than $1,000,000 (Haw et al., 2011; Fan et al., 2010; McVay, 
2006) as sales is used as a deflator for the majority of the variables, thus reducing the full 
sample to 23,164 firm-year observations. Again, utilities firms and financial services 
companies have different reporting environment and regulations, therefore, their observations 
are deleted in line with prior studies (Zalata and Roberts, 2015; Fan et al., 2010; McVay, 2006). 
We classify industries using Fama and French (1997) industry classification code and our 
results are not influenced by the number of observations or classification code. The final sample 
is used to estimate the normal or expected core earnings.  
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(Insert Table 3 here) 
Table 3 above presents descriptive statistics for our regression variables for all firms. The 
mean, median, standard deviation, first quartile and third quartile are reported. The dependent 
variable UNEXP_CE has a mean of 0.002 (approximately zero). The median of UNEXP_CE 
is 0.001 with a standard deviation 0.069. The mean SPITEM is positive (0.002) indicating 
income-decreasing special items. In addition, the mean and median of income-increasing 
special items are positive 0.021 and 0.011 respectively. Also, the mean (median) 
REL×SPITEM and REL×REVT, indicating the interaction between religiosity (REL) and 
income-decreasing special items (SPITEM) and religiosity and special revenue are 
approximately zero. The other distributions are similar and consistent with prior research 
(McVay, 2006; Fan et al, 2010). For example, the mean and median board size is approximately 
11 and ranges between 10 and 11, which is consistent with prior studies (Zalata and Roberts, 
2015; Haw et al., 2011; Lipton and Lorsch, 1992).  Again, the mean board independence shows 
a slight surge to an approximately 67% consistent with prior studies in the U.S. (Abbot et al., 
reported 61%; Frankel, McVay and Soliman, 2011; reported 66 %.). Similarly, audit committee 
size is in line with prior studies in the U.S. (Faleye, 2011; Mangena and Pike, 2005). All other 
univariate statistics and distributions for all variables appear similar to McVay (2006) and Fan 
et al., (2010), which are winsorized at the first and 99th percentile.  
 
4. RESEARCH DESIGN AND EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY 
4.1 Measuring (Unexpected Core Earnings) Classification Shifting  
To estimate classification shifting, firstly, we focus on the allocation of expenses between core 
expenses and special items. Secondly, we focus on misclassification of special revenue items 
into total revenue to increase reported core earnings. We expect core earnings to be overstated 
when core expenses or revenue items are misclassified and anticipate that where managers 
deliberately misclassify core expenses or special revenue; unexpected core earnings will be 
positively associated with special items. We employ McVay’s (2006) and Athanasakou et al. 
(2009) expectation model and make estimates of the coefficients, which are used to compute 
normal core earnings, equation (1) is run cross-sectionally for each industry-year using the 
compustat industry classifications. The unexpected core earnings (UNEXP_CE) is then 
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computed as the difference between reported core earnings (REP_CE) and expected core 
earnings (NOR_CE) for each firm.  
 
𝑁𝑂𝑅_𝐶𝐸𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐶𝐸𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐴𝑇𝑂𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑈𝐴𝐿𝑆𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑈𝐴𝐿𝑆𝑡
+ 𝛽5∆𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑁𝐸𝐺_∆𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡  ,                          
 
(1) 
  
where 𝑁𝑂𝑅_𝐶𝐸𝑡 is the core earnings before noncore special items and depreciation, calculated 
as (Sales – Cost of Goods Sold – Selling, General and Administrative Expenses)/Sales. 𝐶𝐸𝑡−1 
is the lagged core earnings; 𝐴𝑇𝑂𝑡 is the asset turnover ratio. Again, in line with prior studies 
(McVay, 2006; Fan et al., 2010), we include 𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑈𝐴𝐿𝑆𝑡−1, which is prior year operating 
accruals and 𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑈𝐴𝐿𝑆𝑡, which is current year accruals. ∆𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑡 is change in sales and 
𝑁𝐸𝐺_∆𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑡 is the percentage change in sales, where  ∆𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆 is less than 0, otherwise zero.  
4.2 Classification Shifting Using Special Items Expenses and Revenue 
We follow McVay (2006) model to test whether firms shift core expenses into special items or 
special revenue into normal revenue in order to increase their core earnings. We examine the 
classification of core expenses into or special revenue from special items within the income 
statement as an earnings management tool (McVay, 2006; Fan et al., 2010). Core expenses are 
relatively steady, while special items are infrequent or unusual in nature (Fan et al., 2010; 
McVay, 2006; Doyle et al., 2003). When firms’ engage in classification shifting, unexpected 
core earnings increases. 
 
𝑈𝑁𝐸𝑋𝑃_𝐶𝐸𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑃𝐼𝑇𝐸𝑀𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑇 + 𝜀𝑡,     
 
(2) 
where 𝑈𝑁𝐸𝑋𝑃_𝐶𝐸𝑡, is the unexpected core earnings, calculated as the difference between 
reported and normal or expected core earnings from equation (1). The variable of interest 
𝑆𝑃𝐼𝑇𝐸𝑀𝑡 is income-decreasing special items scaled by sales and REVT is total revenue scaled 
by total assets. When firms shift core expenses to income-decreasing special items, they 
increase both core earnings and income-decreasing special items. Similarly, when firms 
classify special revenues as normal revenues they would increase both core earnings and total 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 19 
revenues (Fan et al., 2010; McVay, 2006). Therefore, we expect the coefficients β1 and β2 in 
equation 2 above to be positive. Furthermore, we interact religiosity (REL) with special items 
(SPITEM) and total revenue (REVT) to generate new variables in model (3).  
 
𝑈𝑁𝐸𝑋𝑃𝐶𝐸𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑃𝐼𝑇𝐸𝑀 + 𝛽2𝑅𝐸𝐿 × 𝑆𝑃𝐼𝑇𝐸𝑀𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑇𝑡−1 + 
𝛽4𝑅𝐸𝐿 × REVT + 𝛽5𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿 𝑉𝐴𝑅𝐼𝐴𝐵𝐿𝐸𝑆 + 𝜀𝑡                
 
 
(3) 
We exclude current accruals from equation (1). Recent studies (Fan et al., 2010; Barua and 
Cready, 2008; McVay, 2008) attribute McVay’s estimation of expected core earnings to model 
bias because of the inclusion of contemporaneous accruals in the formation of expected core 
earnings values. These studies argue that the inclusion of current accruals results in the creation 
of a mechanical bias leading to a positive association between unexpected core earnings 
(dependent variable) and special items (independent variable). This therefore, suggests that the 
misclassification of core earnings into special items reported by McVay (2006) is not 
classification shifting but symbolic of model bias. Thus, the Fan et al (2010) model without 
contemporaneous accruals is shown below: 
𝐶𝐸𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐶𝐸𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐴𝑇𝑂𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑈𝐴𝐿𝑆𝑡−1 + 𝛽5∆𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑡
+ 𝛽6𝑁𝐸𝐺_∆𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡                
 
(4) 
In the further supplemental analyses, we estimate the validity and results for both McVay 
(2006) and Fan et al (2010) models to assess the impact of religiosity on classification shifting 
and interact religiosity with corporate governance variables, BIG4 auditors and audit tenure.  
4.2. Testing the Relationship between Religiosity and Classification Shifting 
We use equation 3 and include the interactions between REL and SPITEM, interaction between 
REL and REVT as well as firm-level control variables as shown in equations (5), (6) and (7) 
below. The generic regression model takes the following form. 
UNEXP_CE = β0 + β1 SPITEM + β2REL + β3 REL×SPITEM + β4 SIZE + β5 LEV + β6 CASFO + β7 ROA 
+ β8 BMV + β9 BIG4 + β10 ANALYST_FOL                                                                       (5) 
UNEXP_CE = β0 + β1 REVT + β2REL + β3 REL×REVT  + β4 SIZE + β5 LEV + β6 CASFO + β7 ROA + β8 
BMV + β9 BIG4 + β10 ANALYST_FOL                                                                                        (6) 
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UNEXP_CE = β0 + + β1 SPITEM + β2REL + β3 REL×SPITEM  +β4 REVT + β4REL + β5 REL×REVT  + 
β6 SIZE + β7 LEV + β8 CASFO + β9 ROA + β10 BMV + β11 BIG4 + β12 ANALYST_FOL                                                                                                          
(7) 
To test hypotheses 1a and 1b, we examine the coefficient of the religiosity of firms’ 
environment (REL), the interaction between REL and SPITEM (REL×SPITEM) in equation 
(5). Again, we examine the coefficient of the interaction between REL and REVT 
(REL×REVT) in equation (6) and the combine effect is shown in equation (7). We expect 
religiosity to mitigate managers’ incentive to misclassify core expenses or special revenue to 
increase reported core earnings because of ethical and moral issues involve in the religious 
social norm. Therefore, we anticipate a negative coefficient on REL, RELSPITEM and 
RELREVT.  
Again, we test hypothesis 2 to assess the impact of REL, RELSPITEM and RELREVT on 
UNEXP_CE where the firms have corporate governance mechanism in place.  Initially, we 
control for corporate governance variables and test the interaction between REL and corporate 
governance variables.  In particular, we use board size (BODSIZE), number of independent 
directors (BODIND) and audit committees size (AUCOM) as proxies for corporate governance 
in line with prior studies (Zalata and Anderson, 2015; Haw et al., 2011). The interactions 
between REL and governance variables give the following three new variables. 
REL×BODSIZE; REL×BODIND and REL×AUCOM. Note that board and audit committee 
characteristics are tested separately to avoid multicollinearity problems. We predict significant 
and negative relationship between classification and REL×BODSIZE; REL×BODIND and 
REL×AUCOM. The following regression model is used.  
  UNEXP_CE = β0 + β1 SPITEM + β2REL + β3REL x SPITEM + β4REVT + β5 REL x REVT 
+β6BODSIZE + β7BODIND + β8AUCOM + β9 REL×BODSIZE + β10REL×BODIND + β11 
REL×AUCOM +β12 SIZE + β13LEV + β14CASFO + β15ROA + β16BMV                               (8)                                
5. Empirical Regression Results and Discussions 
To assess whether religiosity is related to classification shifting, we initially investigate 
whether U.S. firms are currently engaged in classification shifting as reported by McVay, 
(2006) and corroborated by Fan et al., (2010). In Table 4, initially, we include only SPITEM 
in Model (2) to provide basic regression results. The coefficient on SPITEM is positive and 
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significant (SPITEM; p-value = 0.002), suggesting that some firms in the U.S. inflate core 
earnings by misclassifying core expenses into special items. Again, when we include only 
REVT in Model (2), the coefficient on REVT is also positive and significant (REVT; p-value 
= 0.001). Finally, we include both SPITEM and REVT in Model 2 and observe a significant 
positive relationship between unexpected core earnings and both SPITEM and REVT. The 
result indicates that when revenue is shifted upward or core expenses are shifted downwards 
on the income statement, unexpected core earnings increases (UNEXP_CE), suggesting that 
firms’ do not only report true and fair performance but are involved in misclassification of 
special items to increase reported  core earnings. This is consistent with prior findings that 
unexpected core earnings increases with special items. Again, firms with huge write-offs and 
restructuring charges tend to perform poorly but the converse is equally true for firms with 
special items (McVay, 2006; Fan et al., 2010).  
(Insert Table 4 here) 
In hypothesis 1, we examine the association between religiosity (REL) and unexpected core 
earnings (UNEXP_CE) as well as the interaction between REL and SPITEM as the variable of 
interest (REL×SPITEM). We run regressions using fixed effects to account for heterogeneity 
across firms and the results are shown in Table 5, Model (5) below. We find that religiosity is 
negatively related to UNEXP_CE, (REL; p-value = 0.004). Similarly, we find a significantly 
negative relationship between REL×SPITEM and UNEXP_CE (REL×SPITEM, p-value = 
0.001). In Table 5 Model (6), we interact REL with REVT and report the regression results of 
UNEXP_CE on REL x REVT. The results show a significant negative relationship between 
UNEXP_CE and REL x REVT (p-value = 0.000). Again, we include all the variables of interest 
in Model (7) and re-run our regression. The results are consistent with previous findings as 
shown in Table 5. That is, religiosity mitigates managers’ incentive to misclassify revenue 
items upwards to increase reported core earnings. Therefore, our results suggest that religious 
managers possibly deem it unacceptable, unethical and morally wrong to engage in 
classification shifting to boost core earnings to signal managers’ inside information to 
investors, raise the expectation of the market or beat/meet earnings benchmarks. Perhaps, as 
indicated by prior studies (McVay, 2006; Fan et al., 2010) this might be due to the limited 
scrutiny of auditors and other external monitors often associated with classification shifting. 
The result is also consistent with prior studies (McGuire et al 2012), which observe that 
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accruals earnings management are negatively related to the religiosity of the firms’ 
environment. This is a noble contribution to literature as our study is the first to attempt an 
association between classification shifting and religiosity of the firms’ environment 
    (Insert Table 5 here)  
In addition, we find that the firm-level control variables are associated with UNEXP_CE in 
line prior studies (Zalata and Roberts, 2015; Haw et al., 2011).  For example, the coefficient of 
ROA is negative and significantly at (1%) related to UNEXP_CE, suggesting that firms engage 
in misclassification when they perform poorly. Again, market book value (MBV) is negative 
and significantly related to UNEXP_CE, suggesting that firms are less likely to engage in 
classification shifting when the book value is high. Similarly, SIZE is negative but 
insignificantly associated with UNEXP_CE, indicating that the sample includes larger firms 
than smaller firms. Ashbaugh et al. (2003) observe that small firms are more likely to 
manipulate reported profits than large firms. Thus, the impact of classification shifting 
decreases, the greater the size of the firm. Again, we observe a positive and significant 
relationship at 5% level between leverage (LEV) and UNEXP_CE. DeFond and Jiambalvo 
(1994) indicate that managers manipulate reported earnings upwards to meet debt covenants or 
contracts. The BIG4 and analyst following exhibit their expected sign and 
significant/insignificant levels in line with prior studies (McVay, 2006; Fan et al., 2010; 
McGuire et al. 2012).    
5.1 Testing Religiosity Across Areas 
The above results and analyses have provided clear evidence that religiosity of the firm’s 
environment influences classification shifting negatively and significantly. However, the 
analyses do not reveal the extent to which the level (high or low) of religiosity in an area will 
affect classification shifting. We test this by empirically breaking down the datasets into two 
samples in line with prior research (McGuire et al., 2012), comprising of high and low religious 
areas and define areas with above (below) the median religiosity figure of 52% in our sample 
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as having high (low) religiosity respectively. We expect that a highly religious environment 
will influence classification shifting more significantly than areas with low religiosity figures3.     
(Insert Table 6 here) 
Table 6 above, presents the results of the analysis of high and low religious areas on managers 
classification shifting. Interestingly, we observe a strong negative at 1% significant level (P< 
0.01) between RELSPITEM and UNEXP_CE in high religiosity areas. Similarly, there is a 
negative relationship at 1% significance level (P<0.03) between REVT and UNEXP_CE at the 
high religiosity areas. In addition, the study notes that the association between REL×SPITEM, 
REL×REVT and UNEXP_CE at the low areas is negative at 5% significance level. This 
reinforces the findings that religious social norms influences classification shifting, and that 
the effect is acute especially in highly religious environment, consistent with prior studies 
(McGuire et al., 2012; Callen et al., 2011; Dyreng et al., 2009). 
5.2 Religiosity, Corporate Governance Variables and Classification Shifting 
We test hypothesis 2 to assess the interactive effect between religiosity and governance 
variables on unexpected core earnings to ensure that previous findings are robust in the 
presence of internal corporate governance. We include BODSIZE, BODIND and AUCOM in 
line with prior research (Zalata and Roberts, 2015).  Thereafter, we focus on the interaction 
between REL×BODSIZE, REL×BODIND and REL×AUCOM to assess their impact on 
UNEXP_CE.  
     (Insert Table 7 here) 
As indicated in Table 7, we find a significant negative relationship (at 1% level, p-value = 
0.001) between REL×SPITEM and UNEXP_CE. Again, the coefficient on REL x REVT and 
UNEXP_CE is negative and significant (-0.13; -3.82). Consistent with prior research (Zalata 
and Roberts, 2015; Haw et al., 2011; Sun and Cahan, 2009), the results show that there is a 
negative association at 5% significant level between UNEXP_CE and BODSIZE, and between 
UNEXP_CE and BODIND at 10% significant level, suggesting that corporate governance 
mechanism within the firms’ in our sample mitigates misclassification of core expenses or 
                                                          
3 We break our sample into high and low religiosity areas because prior studies (McGuire et al., 2012; Callen et al., 2011; Dyreng et al., 2009) 
indicate that a highly religious environment has significant influence on attitudes and behaviour of the people living in that environment. 
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special revenue items. The relationship between UNEXP_CE and AUCOM is negative but not 
significant. With regards to the interactive variables, we also find significant (1%) negative 
association between REL×BODSIZE, REL×BODIND, REL×AUCOM and UNEXP_CE. 
This suggests that REL complements BODSIZE, BODIND and AUCOM to mitigate 
classification shifting, and the impact becomes relatively more pronounced in a religious 
environment. This is consistent with our findings that managers have less motivation to 
misclassify core expenses or revenue items in an environment where religious social norms 
influence managerial behaviour and decisions. Therefore, our initial results are supported that 
religiosity complements existing monitoring mechanism put in place by management.  
5.3 Religiosity and Classification Shifting in Rural and Urban Areas 
To test hypothesis 3, we disaggregate the sample into rural and urban areas. Prior studies 
observe that earnings quality is associated with firms in rural areas (McGuire et al. 2012; Ucran, 
2007). This point is further strengthened when firms in rural areas are audited by the BIG4 
auditors and have strong internal controls (Bayley and Taylor, 2007; Dechow et al., 2010). To 
indicate that religious social norms have influence on firms located in both urban and rural 
areas and that our results are not solely due to the lower and higher earnings quality of the firms 
located in urban and rural areas respectively, we break the sample into urban and rural areas. 
In line with Loughran and Schulz (2005)4, we classify Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) in 
each county with over five million population as urban area and repeat the main test using the 
urban and rural subsamples. 
(Insert Table 8 here) 
Table 8 above, presents the results of the analyses of the relationship between REL×SPITEM, 
REL x REVT and UNEXP_CE for firms located in urban and rural areas. Indeed, the 
conclusions remain the same using both rural and urban sub-samples. We find that both 
                                                          
4 Loughran and Schulz (2005) define urban areas as the most-populated areas with an average of over five million residents in the MSA within 
the county. We replicate our analysis based on their definition and find that the inferences remain the same. 
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REL×SPITEM and REL× REVT are negative and significantly (at 1% level, p-value = 0.004) 
associated with UNEXP_CE, suggesting that the negative association between religious social 
norms and misclassification is not solely influenced by the high or low earnings quality 
associated with rural or urban areas. Note though that the magnitude of the interaction terms 
REL×SPITEM and REL× REVT, also the REL, is higher in the urban areas compared to rural 
areas. Thus, religious social norms are more effective to reduce classification shifting in highly 
populated areas. Overall, the findings are robust and clearly demonstrate that religiosity of the 
firms’ environment mitigates classification shifting.  
6. Robustness Analysis 
6.1 Validity of McVay’s (2006) Model 
In Table 9, we estimate the results for both Athanasakou et al. (2009) and Fan et al. (2010) 
classification shifting models.  To employ Fan et al. (2010) model, we drop contemporaneous 
accruals from McVay's model. We find that UNEXP_CE is positive and significantly (1%; p-
value =0.002) related to SPITEM and REVT. Again, the coefficients of both REL×SPITEM 
and REL× REVT are still negative and significantly (P < 0.001) associated with UNEXP_CE.  
The results are similar to McVay’s (2006), suggesting that our initial findings of 
misclassification of core expenses and revenue items rooted in McVay’s (2006) expectation 
model is bias free. Furthermore, in line with Athanasakou et al (2009), we surrogate total 
accruals by working capital accruals in both McVay’s (2006) and Fan et al (2010) expectation 
models. Athanasakou et al. (2009) observe that the substitution of working capital accruals is 
important because total accruals in the McVay's (2006) model comprise of depreciation 
expenses and special items accruals, which are likely to introduce bias. Therefore, we re-
estimate the regression results using working capital accruals but our results as indicated by 
Athanasakou et al., (2009) model and inferences remain similar to the initial results.  
(Insert Table 9 here)           
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6.2 Auditor Characteristics, Religiosity and Classification Shifting  
Prior studies (Haw et al., 2011; Francis and Yu, 2009; Francis and Wong, 2008; Fan and Wong, 
2005; Myers, Myers and Omer, 2003) observe that auditor characteristics (BIG4 and auditor 
tenure) are negatively associated with earnings management since high quality auditors 
complement existing corporate governance mechanism. Haw et al. (2011) find that in East Asia 
classification shifting decreases with firms audited by the BIG4 and external auditors with short 
tenure are associated with lower earnings quality. Similarly, Myers et al. (2003) find that longer 
auditor tenure is a function of higher quality reporting and lower misclassification 
management. In our previous analyses, we control for BIG4 and analyst following but observe 
insignificant negative relationship between UNEXP_CE and BIG4 auditors. Therefore, the 
study assesses the extent to which the interaction between religiosity and auditor characteristics 
impact classification shifting.  
Panel A in Table 10 indicates the regression results when we include only income-decreasing 
special items (SPITEM) in Model (5), the results show a positive and significant co-efficient 
of (0.14, t = 2.03). However, the coefficient on SPITEM x BIG4 is negative but not significant (-
0.04, t = -1.09). We include the interaction between BIG4 and REL in Model (5), the coefficient 
on REL×BIG4 is negative and significant (-0.13, t = -1.94), similarly the interaction among 
REL×SPITEM×BIG4 shows a significant and negative coefficient of (-0.25 t = -2.21), 
indicating that religiosity complements BIG4 auditors and existing monitoring mechanism to 
mitigate income-decreasing classification shifting.  In Model (6), we include only special 
revenue, the coefficient on REVT is positive and significant (0.06, t = 2.05), but the coefficient 
on REVT×BIG4 is negative but not significant (-0.03, t = -1.23). Thereafter, we interact REL, 
REVT and BIG4, the results show that the coefficient on REL×REVT×BIG4 is negative and 
significant (-0.18, t = -2.14). When we include both REVT and SPITEM in Model (7), the 
results and inferences remain the same. The coefficient on SPITEM×BIG4 is (-0.05, t = -1.64) 
and REVT×BIG4 is (-0.04, t = -1.36) still negative but not significant. The coefficient on 
REL×SPITEM×BIG4 is (-0.17, t = -1.81) and REL×REVT×BIG4 is (-0.16, t = -1.98) both are 
negative and significant at 10%. Overall, we report some evidence that firms with BIG4 
auditors in relation to religious social norms engage less in upward and downward 
classification shifting. Note though that there is some variability in the significance of such 
effect. 
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(Insert Table 10 here) 
In Table 10, Panel B, the study shows regression results to indicate whether or not audit tenure, 
interaction between audit tenure (TEN in Table 10 captures the number of years the auditor has 
been with the company) and religiosity affect classification shifting.  We include only SPITEM 
in Model (5) and the coefficient is positive and significant (0.33, t = 2.94) while the result for 
SPITEM×TEN is negative but not significant (-0.06, t = -1.38) suggesting that audit tenure 
might not mitigate classification shifting. We include the interaction between REL and TEN as 
well as REL, SPITEM and TEN in Model (5).  The coefficient on REL×TEN is negative and 
significant (-0.04, t = -2.08) and the coefficient on REL×SPITEM×TEN is also negative and 
significant (-0.05, t = -2.45) suggesting that classification shifting is less in a religious social 
norm environment with firms having a longer tenure relationship with their auditors. However, 
long audit tenure alone does not mitigate misclassification but religiosity complements long 
tenure and the existing monitoring mechanism in the firms (McGuire et al. 2012).  Again, we 
include REVT in Model (6), the coefficient is positive and significant (0.02, t = 3.09) and the 
coefficient on REVT×TEN is negative and significant (-0.09, t = -2.40). The results for 
RELxTEN and REL×REVT×TEN are (-0.08, t = -1.82) and (-0.06, -2.31) respectively. We 
include both SPITEM and REVT in Model (7) and the results remain the same. The overall 
results indicate that classification shifting is subdued in a religious social norm environment 
and that religiosity complements the existing monitoring mechanism such as corporate 
governance and audit practices.    
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6.3 Testing Misclassification in Pre and Post Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2000 and Financial 
Crises 
 
To ensure that the results of the study are not influenced by confounding effects of various 
events that took place during the study period, the study examines the extent to which 
religiosity affects misclassification of special items in the pre and post SOX or financial crises 
and stock market crash period. To achieve this, the study breaks the data into the period prior 
to the implementation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX, 2000-2002), the period prior to the 
financial crises and stock market crash (2003-2009) and the post financial crises period (2010-
2015). The study expects religiosity to complement SOX and other monitoring mechanisms. 
Prior studies (Leuz and Christian, 2007; Engel, Ellen, Hayes and Wang, 2006; Jain and Rezaee, 
2006; Bushee and Leuz, 2005) indicate that the SOX enactment brought about an improvement 
in the reliability of financial information, reduction of financial statement fraud, strengthening 
of corporate governance mechanism and improvement in the liquidity of firms. Again, Cohen 
et al., (2008) observe that the level of real activities earnings management increased after the 
passage of SOX but decreased prior to SOX. Conversely, they find that accrual-based earnings 
management activities were high prior to the passage of SOX, suggesting that firms engage in 
more real activities than accruals based earnings management after the passage of the SOX. 
Therefore, this study examines whether or not misclassification occurred pre and post the 
passage of SOX in 2002. 
(Insert Table 11 here)  
  
The regression results in Table 11 show that firms in the U.S engage in misclassification of 
special items to boost reported core earnings in pre and post SOX and financial crises period.  
From the results, there was a positive relationship at 1% significant level between SPITEM, 
REVT and UNEXP_CE across all the levels. Prior to the enactment of SOX in 2002, the results 
show a positive and significant co-efficient of (0.32, t = 4.52) between SPITEM and 
UNEXP_CE. Similarly, the post SOX and financial crises period show a positive and 
significant co-efficient of (0.21, t = 2.48 and 0.18, t = 2.38) between SPITEM and UNEXP_CE 
respectively. In addition, the relationship between REVT and UNEXP_CE is also significantly 
positive in both pre and post SOX and financial crises period (0.19, t = 3.98; 0.15, t = 2.58 and 
0.12, t = 2.18; respectively), suggesting that some firms in the U.S. are engaged in upward 
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classification shifting of special revenue to boost reported core earnings.  In relation to whether 
religiosity impacts misclassification in the pre or post SOX and financial crises period, the 
results show that REL x SPITEM and REL x REVT are negatively related to UNEXPE_CE at 
1% significant level. However, the coefficients and t-values (REL x SPITEM AND 
UNEXP_CE, -0.17, t = -3.64; -0.22, t = -3.92; -0.20, t = -3.87; REL x REVT and UNEXP_CE,-
0.07, t = -3.26; -0.08, -3.47; -0.09, -3.91; respectively)  are significant at the period after the 
enactment of SOX and financial crises period, suggesting that religiosity complements SOX 
and other monitoring systems to mitigate misclassification of core expenses and special 
revenue after the enactment of SOX in 2002. The results indicate that classification shifting of 
special expenses and revenue items occur in firms the U.S. but decreases in the religious social 
norms environment where there is external monitoring.  
 
6.4 Geographical Dispersion 
Furthermore, the analyses above have been based on the assumption that religiosity in the 
geographic area surrounding the firm’s headquarters has influence on misclassification of core 
expenses and special revenue to boost reported core earnings. However, McGuire et al (2012) 
indicate that firms are geographically dispersed with geographic segments located in areas far 
away from their corporate headquarters.  Some of these segments have autonomous structures 
which allow them to make decisions on behalf of corporate headquarters. Therefore, it’s 
possible that the religious social norms in the area surrounding the corporate headquarters will 
have no influence on the segments financial reporting and classification shifting behaviour. 
This is possible because the segmental reports and decisions are more likely to be influenced 
by the religious social norms of the area where the segments are located. Consequently, the 
study creates two sub samples in line with the geographic segment data from the compustat to 
assess whether the results differ based on the geographic dispersion of the firm.  
Following prior research (McGuire et al., 2012), the study utilises the geographic segment data 
from the compustat annual database. Thereafter, the study finds the mean and median of the 
segments and observes that 2.05 represents the mean segments, the median segments is 1.04 
and the maximum number of geographic segment is 35. Therefore, the study classifies firms 
with two or less geographic segment as being centralized and those firms with more than two 
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geographic segments as geographically dispersed. Table 12 shows the regressions results of 
geographically centralised and dispersed segment regressions analysis. The study finds that the 
association between religion and unexpected core earnings is significantly negative at 1% in 
the geographically centralised sample, consistent with the earlier findings. For example, the 
coefficient on both REL x SPITEM and REL x REVT are negative and significant. In contrast, 
the relationship between religiosity and unexpected core earnings is negative but not significant 
in the geographically dispersed sample. This result is consistent with initial findings suggesting 
that the geographic dispersion influences the extent to which religious social norms subdue 
expense misclassification to increase reported core earnings. Furthermore, the results confirm 
that religious social norms in the firm’s environment has negative impact on expense 
misclassification into special items. 
 
                                                 (Insert Table 12 here) 
 
The results in Table 12 for geographically centralised and dispersed segments are not perfectly 
comparable because of the differences in the sample size. To minimize selection bias, noise 
and check whether the difference in sample size has effects on the inferences, the study repeats 
the centralised regressions using 4541 firm year observations to be consistent with geographic 
dispersed segment sample. Table 13 provides the results which are quite similar and consistent 
with the previous results reported in Table 12. Again, SPITEM is positive significantly related 
to UNEXP_CE. In addition, the coefficients on both REL x SPITEM and REL x REVT are 
negative and significant at 99% confidence level. This suggests that the results of the study are 
not prone or subject to sample selection bias. 
(Insert Table 13 here) 
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6.5 Alternative Measure of Religiosity 
Although our measure of religious social norm is supported by prior studies (McGuire et al. 
2012; Callen et al 2011; Grullon et al. 2010), we conduct further robustness tests to ensure that 
our results are free from potential bias and do not rely on generalisation of religious datasets 
across several years. We use different source of religious datasets collected by Gallup survey 
for the study period.5 We run our regressions for only the twenty U.S. States with available 
Gallup religious datasets. Interestingly, we find that the results presented in Table 14 are 
consistent with our initial results. Our inferences still remain the same when religiosity was 
measured by a simple aggregate of the responses to the three Gallup questions on religion. 
Specifically, the coefficients on RELxSPITEM and RELxREVT are negative and significant 
(-0.13, t = -4.02) and (-0.11, t = -2.89) respectively, indicating that religiosity mitigates 
misclassification.  Overall, the results suggest that religiosity complements existing monitoring 
systems put in place by management to mitigate classification-shifting behaviour. This is 
consistent with prior findings by McGuire et al., (2012) which indicate that religious managers 
deem accruals-based earnings management as unethical, not feasible, morally unacceptable and 
inappropriate. Our results indicate that managers have disincentive to signal information to 
investors to increase reported core earnings. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
5 Thereafter, we take a sub-sample of our original data based on the twenty most and least religious states in the U.S. as reported by Gallup 
survey in Table 2. We surrogate our original religious datasets by Gallup religious datasets for the twenty U.S. States and merge them into the 
compustat financial data file using the state code identifiers. 
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7. Conclusion 
This study examines economic or opportunistic motivation to misclassification of special items 
in a religious social norm environment. We contribute to financial reporting and earnings 
management literature and provide evidence that religiosity is negatively associated with 
upward and downward classification shifting and that managers have little economic or 
opportunistic motivation to misclassification in a religious environment.  Religiosity appears 
to be more effective to combat classification shifting in urban and highly religious areas.  In 
addition, our study further shows that religiosity complements corporate governance, for 
example, board size, board independence, BIG4 auditors and audit tenure to mitigate 
classification shifting. The study has several policy and practical implications. Firstly, the 
findings are consistent with social norm theory as social norms are reported to shape the 
behaviour and attitudes of managers in corporate decision-making. The study highlights the 
complementary role of religion and the associated interaction between religiosity, corporate 
governance and audit practices. Therefore, it provides a platform for management to strengthen 
the existing corporate governance and audit practices. This is important because religion is 
scarcely discussed in secular organisations but an understanding of the role of religion in 
shaping corporate financial reporting will help policy decisions to create value for shareholders. 
The present results are useful for regulators, external monitors and investors as it indicates that 
religion strengthens the existing monitoring mechanism put in place by management to 
mitigate classification shifting. 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix A: The following table shows the measurement of variables in the study: 
Variables Proxy Definition 
 
Religiosity  
REL 
Strength of religiosity for each U.S. county measured by 
Association of Statisticians of American Religious 
Bodies (ASARB) surveys. The results of these surveys 
are published on the website of Association of Religion 
Data Archive (ARDA). The average of each county 
religiosity score is weighted by the county’s population. 
Normal Core 
Earnings 
NOR_CE This is the core earnings that is actually expected to 
occur in the normal course of business activity devoid 
of classification shifting.  The study follows McVay 
(2006) expectation model in equation 1. 
 
Reported Core 
Earnings     REP_CE
 
Estimated as sales – cost of goods sold – selling, general 
and administration expenses. Depreciation and 
Amortization are excluded from Cost of Sales, Selling, 
General and Administrative Expenses. 
Unexpected 
Core Earnings    UNEXP_CE 
Is the difference between reported core earnings and 
normal or expected core earnings (McVay, 2006). 
Special Items 
SPTIEM 
Income-Decreasing Special Items as a Percentage of 
Sales, calculated as [Special Items (#17)  ]/Sales (#12) 
when Special Items are income-decreasing, and 0 
otherwise (McVay, 2006) 
Total Revenue 
REVT 
Total revenue scaled by total assets 
 
Asset 
Turnover 
ATO
 
Sales scaled by average net operating assets. Where net 
operating assets is the difference between operating 
assets and operating liabilities. Operating assets = Total 
assets – Cash and Cash equivalent. Operating Liabilities 
= Total assets – Total debt - Book value of common 
equity – Preferred equity – Minority interests.
 Percent change 
in sales 
∆Sales
 
(Salest – Salest-1)/ Salest
 % change in 
Sales 
NEG_∆Sales
 
where ∆SALES is less than 0, otherwise zero
 Cash flow 
from operation 
CASFO Is the cash flow from operational activities scaled 
lagged total assets 
Total Assets TA Measured as total Non-current assets plus total current 
assets 
Size of the 
Firm 
SIZE 
The natural log of total assets 
Return on 
Assets 
ROA Measured as net income before extraordinary items 
divided by average total assets 
Leverage LEV Financial leverage, measured as total debts scaled by 
total equity 
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Market to 
Book Value 
MBV Measured as total assets divided by market 
capitalization 
Reported Loss  LOSS An indicator variable that equals 1 if income before 
extraordinary items was negative in the current or 
previous two fiscal years, and 0 otherwise; 
Audit 
Committee 
Presence  
AUCOM 
A dummy variable coded as 1 if the company has an 
audit committee, otherwise zero. 
Independent 
Board  
BODIND Calculated as the number of independent directors 
divided by the total number of directors on the board. 
Defined as non-executive directors holding less than 5% 
of the voting securities and having no direct or indirect 
interest or relationship that could reasonably influence 
their objective judgment and decision making 
Board Size  BODSIZE Total number of directors on the board 
Religiosity 
interacts Board 
size 
 RELBODSIZE Religiosity multiplied by Board Size 
Religiosity 
interacts Board 
independence 
RELBODIND Religiosity multiplied by Board independence 
Religiosity 
interacts Audit 
Committee 
RELAUCOM Religiosity multiplied by Audit committee 
BIG4 Auditors BIG4 
Is an indicator variable that equals 1 if a company’s 
auditing firm is one of the BIG4 auditors, otherwise 
zero (0)   
Audit Tenure TEN 
The natural log of the number years the auditor has been 
with the company. 
Analysts 
Following 
ANA_FOL Natural log of the number of analyst following the firm 
Total Accruals  
TAC 
Difference between earnings before extraordinary items 
and discontinued operations and the cash flow from 
operational activities scaled by lagged total assets 
Operating 
Accrual 
ACCRUALS
 
Operating Accrual = (Net income before extraordinary 
items – cash flow from operation)/Sales.
 Working 
Capital 
Accruals 
WC_ACCRUAL
S 
Measured as earnings before extraordinary items plus 
depreciation and amortisation minus cash flow from 
operational activities. 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for Religiosity 
Variable  Mean Std. Dev. Q1 Median Q3 Skewness Kurtosis 
REL 53.5 18.07 36.27 52.47 63.33 0.83 2.69 
RELAdh – 2000 53 18.6 39.4 51.1 64.7 0.74 2.98 
RELAdh – 2010 48 15.6 24.6 46.8 52.3 0.88 2.68 
Notes: Religiosity (REL) = is the variable of interest, measured as the average of US counties religiosity score weighted by 
the county’s population for the period, 2000 and 2010. RELAdh = a measure of religious adherence for US counties in, 2000 
and 2010. Association of Statisticians of American Religious Bodies (ASARB) collects religiosity dataset, which are published 
by the Association of Religion Data Archive (ARDA). 
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Table 2: Comparison of Most and Least Religious States in the US 
Ten Most  
Religious States in US 
Ranking 
Top States 
Ten Least 
 Religious States in US 
Ranking 
Bottom States 
Mississippi 1 Vermont 1 
Utah 2 New Hampshire 2 
Alabama 3 Maine 3 
Louisiana 4 Massachusetts 4 
South Carolina 5 Oregon 5 
Tennessee 6 Nevada 6 
Georgia 7 Washington 7 
Arkansas 8 Connecticut 8 
North Carolina 9 Hawaii 9 
Oklahoma 10 District of Columbia 10 
Notes: Table 2 shows comparison of most and least religious states in the US compiled by Gallup. Since 1965, Gallup has 
conducted interviews about US adults’ religiosity. The results over the years suggest that religious attitudes are very stable, 
consistent with ASARB studies. The percentage of US adults who consider religion to be important according to Gallup are 
as follows: 1990 = 58 percent; 2000 = 58 percent; 2005 = 55 percent; 2006 = 56 percent; 2007 = 56 percent; 2008 = 54 percent; 
2009 = 56 percent; 2010 = 56 percent 
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Notes: UNEXP_CE = computed as the difference between reported core earnings (REP_CE) and expected core earnings 
(NOR_CE) for each firm (McVay, 2006). REP_CE is the reported core earnings estimated as sales – cost of goods sold – 
selling, general and administration expenses. Depreciation and Amortization are excluded from Cost of Sales, Selling, General 
and Administrative Expenses. BODSIZE = total number of directors on the board; BODIND = calculated as the number of 
independent directors divided by the total number of directors on the board; AUCOM = audit committee REL×BODSIZE 
= religiosity multiplied by board size; REL×BODIND = religiosity multiplied by board independence; 
REL×AUCOM = religiosity multiplied by audit committee. REVT is total revenue scaled by total assets. 
REL×REVT =religiosity multiplied by total revenue scaled by total assets. ATO is Sales scaled by average net 
operating assets. Where net operating assets is the difference between operating assets and operating liabilities. Operating 
assets = Total assets – Cash and Cash equivalent. Operating Liabilities = Total assets – Total debt - Book value of common 
equity – Preferred equity – Minority interests. ACCRUALS is calculated as (Net income before extraordinary items – cash 
flow from operation)/Sales. ∆Sales is (Salest – Salest-1)/ Salest and NEG_∆Sales is where ∆SALES is less than 0, otherwise 
zero. SIZE is the natural log of total assets, LEV is the financial leverage measured as the total debts scaled by total equity, 
 
Table 3 
Descriptive Statistics for the Full Sample 
Variables Mean Median Standard 
Deviation 
25% 75% 
SALES (in M) 1627.363 202.597 3441.067 30.883 1159.031 
UNEXP_CE 0.002 0.003 0.069 -0.003 0.004 
SPITEM 0.002 0.001 0.012 0.001 0.008 
REVT 0.021 0.011 0.061 0.001 0.029 
RELxSPITEM -0.004 -0.003 0.002 -0.001 0.003 
RELxREVT 0.005 0.003 0.159 0.000 0.109 
BODSIZE 11.428 11.303 4.196 9.597 13.245 
BODIND 0.670 0.720 0.078 0.650 0.770 
AUCOM 5.458 5.256 2.284 4.125 5.502 
REL×BODSIZE 6.905 6.960 1.862 6.226 7.558 
REL×BODIND 0.081 0.108 0.033 0.055 0.32 
REL×AUCOM 3.567 3.744 1.097 3.726 3.834 
ATO 2.143 1.782 1.531 0.950 2.981 
CHANGE_ATO 0.029 0.004 0.376 -0.135 0.141 
ACCRUALS -0.019 0.028 0.201 -0.035 0.077 
ACCRUALSt-1 -0.026 0.029 0.254 -0.030 0.078 
∆SALES 0.096 0.058 0.300 -0.055 0.191 
NEG_∆SALES 0.075 0.043 0.359 -0.048 0.176 
SIZE 5.680 5.190 1.760 3.390 6.860 
LEV 0.151 0.101 0.162 0.001 0.252 
CASFO 0.072 0.089 0.156 0.045 0.141 
ROA -0.311 0.042 0.141 -0.032 0.084 
MBV 2.012 1.754 1.212 1.024 2.912 
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CASFO is the cash flow from operational activities scaled lagged total assets ROA is measured as net income before 
extraordinary items divided by average total assets and MBV is measured as total assets divided by market capitalization. All 
other variables are defined above and in the Appendix A
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Table 4: Regression of Unexpected Core Earnings on Special Expenses and Special 
Revenue  
 
Dependent Variable = UNEXP_CE 
Variables  SPITEM REVT SPITEM & REVT  
 Coefficient t-values Coefficient t-values Coefficient t-values 
Intercept 0.002 0.33 -0.010 -2.47** -0.08 -2.30*** 
SPITEM 0.31 3.11***   0.46 4.20*** 
REVT   0.13 3.65*** 0.14 3.57*** 
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 23,164 23,164 23,164 23,164 23,164 23,164 
Adjusted R2 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.09 0.09 
Notes: We use *,**,*** in a two tailed test to respectively indicate statistical significance at 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 
percent levels. We show co-efficient estimates and t-statistics in separate columns. SPITEM = income-decreasing special items 
scaled by sales, REVT is total revenue scaled by total assets. The parameters are estimated based on the following model: All variables 
are defined in appendix. 
 
  UNEXP_CE = β0 + β1 SPITEM + β2 REVT. 
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Table 5: Regression of Unexpected Core Earnings on Special Items Expenses and 
Special Revenue    
 
Dependent Variable = UNEXP_CE 
Variables  Model (5)  Model (6)  Model (7)  
 Coefficient t-values Coefficient t-values Coefficient t-values 
Intercept -0.07 -1.61 0.06 1.74* -0.04 -1.30 
SPITEM  0.28 3.78***   0.16 3.41*** 
REVT   0.16 4.35*** 0.12 3.97*** 
REL -0.34 -3.74*** -0.30 3.38** -0.28 -2.76** 
REL×SPITEM -0.23 -2.92***   -0.19 -2.56** 
REL×REVT   -0.09   -7.88*** -0.08 -4.51** 
SIZE -0.03 -1.45 -0.05 -1.17 -0.06 -1.19 
LEV  0.07 2.26** 0.09 2.53** 0.10 2.68** 
CASFO  0.09 1.10 0.02 1.07 0.05 1.15 
ROA -0.06  3.37*** -0.16  2.37** -0.18  2.39** 
MBV -0.03 -2.07** -0.04 -1.77* -0.06 -1.78* 
BIG4 -0.04 -1.62 -0.03 -1.22 -0.04 -1.28 
ANA_FOL -0.04 -1.56 -0.02 -1.36 -0.04 -1.42 
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 23,164 23,164 23,164 23,164 23,164 23,164 
Adjusted R2 0.16 0.16 0.18 0.18 0.24 0.24 
Notes: We use *,**,*** in a two tailed test to respectively indicate statistical significance at 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 
percent levels. We show co-efficient estimates and t-statistics in separate columns. SPITEM = income-decreasing special items 
scaled by sales, REVT is total revenue scaled by total assets, REL = religiosity of the firms’ environment, REL×SPITEM = interaction between 
religiosity and income-decreasing special items. REL×REVT = interaction between religiosity and total revenue scaled by total assets. SIZE 
is the natural log of total assets, LEV is the financial leverage measured as the total debts scaled by total equity, CASFO is the cash flow from 
operational activities scaled by lagged total assets. ROA is measured as net income before extraordinary items divided by average total assets 
and MBV is measured as total assets divided by market capitalization. BIG4 is an indicator variable that equals 1 if a firm is audited by the 
BIG4, otherwise zero and ANLYST_FOL represents the natural log of the number of financial analyst following the firm..The parameters are 
estimated based on the following model: All variables are defined in appendix. 
UNEXP_CE = β0 + + β1 SPITEM + β2REL + β3 SPITEM × REL +β4 REVT + β5 REVT × REL + β6 SIZE + β7 
LEV + β8 CASFO + β9 ROA + β10 BMV + β11 BIG4 + β12 ANALYST_FOL                                                                                                         
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 52 
 
Table 6: Classification Shifting in High and Low Religiosity Areas 
 HIGH  LOW 
Variables Coefficient t-values  Coefficient t-values 
Intercept -0.08 -0.060  -0.03 -0.077 
SPITEM   0.08 3.16***  0.04 2.45** 
REVT   0.18  3.85***  0.09 2.20** 
REL -0.36 -3.09***  -0.07 -1.82* 
REL×SPITEM -0.26 -3.28***  -0.06 -2.04** 
REL×REVT -0.14 -3.09***  -0.08 -2.27** 
SIZE -0.08 -2.45**  -0.05 -2.04** 
LEV  0.08     1.61   0.08  1.32 
CASFO  0.15 2.91**   0.11  0.62 
ROA -0.05    -2.18**  -0.12 -1.78* 
MBV -0.06    -1.69*  -0.05 -1.19 
BIG4 -0.04     -1.54  -0.03 -0.89 
ANA_FOL -0.03     -1.21  -0.02 -1.02 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.27 0.27  0.22 0.22 
Observations 14,124 14,124  8,566 8,566 
Notes: We use *,**,*** in a two tailed test to respectively indicate statistical significance at 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent 
levels. We show co-efficient estimates and t-statistics in separate columns. SPITEM = income-decreasing special items scaled 
by sales, REVT is total revenue scaled by total assets, REL = religiosity of the firms’ environment, REL×SPITEM = interaction 
between religiosity and income-decreasing special items. REL×REVT = interaction between religiosity and total revenue 
scaled by total assets. SIZE is the natural log of total assets, LEV is the financial leverage measured as the total debts scaled 
by total equity, CASFO is the cash flow from operational activities scaled by lagged total assets. ROA is measured as net 
income before extraordinary items divided by average total assets and MBV is measured as total assets divided by market 
capitalization BIG4 is an indicator variable that equals 1 if a firm is audited by the BIG4, otherwise zero and ANLYST_FOL 
represents the natural log of the number of financial analyst following the firm.. The parameters are estimated based on the 
following model: All variables are defined in appendix. 
 
  UNEXP_CE = β0 + + β1 SPITEM + β2REL + β3 SPITEM × REL +β4 REVT +  β5 REVT × REL + β6 SIZE + β7 
LEV + β8 CASFO + β9 ROA + β10 BMV + β11 BIG4 + β12 ANALYST_FOL                                                                                                         
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Table 7: Impact of Religiosity and Governance Variables on Classification Shifting 
 
Dependent Variable = UNEXP_CE 
 Coefficient  t-value 
Intercept -0.08  -1.37 
SPITEM  0.06  2.94*** 
REVT  0.19  3.50*** 
REL -0.12  -3.64*** 
RELxSPITEM -0.15  -3.12*** 
RELxREVT -0.13  -3.82*** 
BODSIZE -0.03  -2.22** 
BODIND -0.04  -1.74* 
AUCOM -0.02  -0.74 
REL×BODSIZE -0.24  -3.92*** 
REL×BODIND -0.39  -3.67*** 
REL×AUCOM -0.17   -2.87*** 
SIZE -0.02  -1.17 
LEV  0.11  1.70 
CASFO  0.03  0.86 
ROA -0.07  -1.19 
MBV -0.03  -1.76* 
Year Fixed Effects Yes  Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.52  0.52 
Observations 23164  23164 
 
We use *,**,*** in a two tailed test to respectively indicate statistical significance at 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels. 
We show co-efficient estimates and t-statistics in separate columns. SPITEM = income-decreasing special items scaled by 
sales, REVT is total revenue scaled by total assets. REL = religiosity of the firms’ environment, REL x SPITEM = interaction 
between religiosity and income-decreasing special items. REL×REVT = interaction between religiosity and total 
revenue scaled by total assets. SIZE is the natural log of total assets, LEV is the financial leverage measured as the total 
debts scaled by total equity, CASFO is the cash flow from operational activities scaled by lagged total assets. ROA is measured 
as net income before extraordinary items divided by average total assets and MBV is measured as total assets divided by 
market capitalization. BODSIZE = total number of directors on the board; BODIND = calculated as the number of independent 
directors divided by the total number of directors on the board; AUCOM = a dummy variable coded as 1 if the company has 
an audit committee, otherwise zero; REL×BODSIZE = religiosity multiplied by board size; REL×BODIND = religiosity 
multiplied by board independence; REL×AUCOM = religiosity multiplied by audit committee; The parameters are estimated 
based on the following model. All variables are defined in the appendix. 
UNEXP_CE = β0 + β1 SPITEM + β2REL + β3RELSPITEM + β4 REVT + β5 REVT × REL + β6BODSIZE 
+ β7BODIND + β8AUCOM + β9RELxBODSIZE + β10RELxBODIND + β11RELxAUCOM +β12 SIZE 
+ β13LEV + β14CASFO + β15ROA + β16BMV                                                                                                                           
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Table 8: Impact of Religion on Classification Shifting in Urban and Rural Areas  
 URBAN  RURAL 
Variables Coefficient t-values  Coefficient t-values 
Intercept -0.06 -0.70  -0.09 -0.47 
SPITEM 0.07 2.28**  0.04 2.69** 
REVT 0.15 3.62***  0.11 2.20** 
REL -0.12 -3.21***  -0.09 -3.51*** 
REL×SPITEM -0.13 -3.45***  -0.11 -3.37*** 
REL×REVT -0.14 -3.09***  -0.08 -2.27** 
SIZE -0.08 -2.32**  -0.05 -1.74* 
LEV 0.06 1.06  0.00 1.01 
CASFO 0.16 2.23**  0.08 2.18** 
ROA -0.06 -1.77*  -0.07 -1.75* 
MBV -0.06 -1.04  -0.05 -1.02 
BIG4 -0.03 -1.36  -0.02 -1.49 
ANAL_FOL -0.04 -1.26  -0.03 -1.09 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.37 0.37  0.33 0.33 
Observations 18,124 18,124  4,253 4,253 
Notes: We use *,**,*** in a two tailed test to respectively indicate statistical significance at 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent 
levels. We show co-efficient estimates and t-statistics in separate columns. SPITEM = income-decreasing special items scaled 
by sales, REVT is total revenue scaled by total assets. REL = religiosity of the firms’ environment, REL×SPITEM = interaction 
between religiosity and income-decreasing special items. REL×REVT = interaction between religiosity and total revenue 
scaled by total assets. SIZE is the natural log of total assets, LEV is the financial leverage measured as the total debts scaled 
by total equity, CASFO is the cash flow from operational activities scaled by lagged total assets. ROA is measured as net 
income before extraordinary items divided by average total assets and MBV is measured as total assets divided by market 
capitalization. BIG4 is an indicator variable that equals 1 if a firm is audited by the BIG4, otherwise zero and ANLYST_FOL 
represents the log of the number of financial analyst following the firm. The parameters are estimated based on the following 
model: All variables are defined in appendix. 
UNEXP_CE = β0 + + β1 SPITEM + β2REL + β3 SPITEM × REL +β4 REVT + β5 REVT × REL + β6 SIZE + β7 
LEV + β8 CASFO + β9 ROA + β10 BMV + β11 BIG4 + β12 ANALYST_FOL                                           
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Table 9: Religiosity and Different Models of Classification Shifting. 
 
Athanasakou et al. 
(2009) Model 
 
Fan et al. 
 (2010) Model 
Variables Coefficient t-values  Coefficient t-values 
Intercept -0.08 -0.65  -0.05 -0.73 
SPITEM 0.07 3.27***  0.08 2.96*** 
REVT 0.16 3.78***  0.12 2.24** 
REL -0.12 -2.93***  -0.17 -3.65*** 
REL×SPITEM -0.15 -3.09***  -0.13 -3.07*** 
REL×REVT -0.09 -3.83***  -0.11 -2.48** 
SIZE -0.03 -2.14**  -0.04 -2.48** 
LEV 0.19 1.41  0.03  1.56 
CASFO 0.19 1.49  0.13 1.48 
ROA -0.08 -1.71*  -0.09 -1.67* 
MBV -0.07  -2.04**  -0.04 -2.28** 
BIG4 -0.04 -1.22  -0.05 -1.09 
ANA_FOL -0.03 -1.37  -0.04 -1.27 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.53 0.53  0.46 0.46 
Observations 23164 23164  23164 23164 
Notes: We use *,**,*** in a two tailed test to respectively indicate statistical significance at 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent 
levels. We show co-efficient estimates and t-statistics in separate columns. SPITEM = income-decreasing special items scaled 
by sales, REVT is total revenue scaled by total assets. REL = religiosity of the firms’ environment, REL×SPITEM = interaction 
between religiosity and income-decreasing special items. REL× REVT = interaction between religiosity and total revenue 
scaled by total assets. SIZE is the natural log of total assets, LEV is the financial leverage measured as the total debts scaled 
by total equity, CASFO is the cash flow from operational activities scaled by lagged total assets. ROA is measured as net 
income before extraordinary items divided by average total assets and MBV is measured as total assets divided by market 
capitalization. BIG4 is an indicator variable that equals 1 if a firm is audited by the BIG4, otherwise zero and ANLYST_FOL 
represents the natural log of the number of financial analyst following the firm. The parameters are estimated based on the 
following model: All variables are defined in appendix. 
 
  UNEXP_CE = β0 + + β1 SPITEM + β2REL + β3 SPITEM × REL +β4 REVT + β5 REVT × REL + β6 SIZE + β7 
LEV + β8 CASFO + β9 ROA + β10 BMV + β11 BIG4 + β12 ANALYST_FOL
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Table 10: Regression of Unexpected Core Earnings on Special Items Expenses and 
Special Revenue: Auditor Characteristics & Religiosity 
Dependent Variable = UNEXP_CE 
Variables  Model (5) 
SPITEM 
Model (6) 
REVT 
Model (7) 
SPITEM & REVT 
Panel A: BIG4  Auditors 
 Coefficient t-values Coefficient t-values Coefficient t-values 
Intercept -0.05 -0.37 0.07 1.31 0.06 0.80 
SPITEM  0.14   2.03**   0.16   2.05** 
SPITEM×BIG4 -0.04 -1.09   -0.05 -1.64 
REVT    0.06  2.05** 0.09   1.97** 
REVT×BIG4   -0.03 -1.23 -0.04 -1.36 
REL×SPITEM×BIG4 -0.25 -2.21**   -0.17 -1.81** 
REL×REVT×BIG4   -0.18 -2.14** -0.16 -1.98** 
REL×BIG4 -0.13  -1.94**  -0.05 -2.32** -0.07 -2.33** 
BIG4 -0.08 -1.24 -0.03 -1.42 -0.09  -0.883 
Con. Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 23,164 23,164 23,164 23,164 23,164 23,164 
Adjusted R2 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.11 0.11 
Panel B: Auditor Tenure 
       
Intercept -0.04 -0.39 -0.02 -0.54 -0.03         0.69 
SPITEM  0.33 2.94***   -0.30  2.86*** 
SPITEM×TEN -0.06 -1.38   -0.08 -1.21 
REVT    0.02  3.09***        0.02  3.04*** 
REVT×TEN   -0.09 -2.40**  -0.08 -2.68** 
REL×SPITEM×TEN  -0.05 -2.45**    -0.07 3.15*** 
REL×REVT×TEN   -0.06  2.31**     -0.08**  -2.39** 
RELTEN -0.04 -2.08** -0.08 -1.82*    -0.07* -1.78* 
TEN -0.02 -0.88 -0.04 -1.54  -0.05 -1.55 
Con. Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 23,164 23,164 23,164 23,164 23,164 23,164 
Adjusted R2 0.08 0.08 0.06 0.06 0.09 0.09 
Notes: We use *,**,*** in a two tailed test to respectively indicate statistical significance at 10 percent, 5 
percent and 1 percent levels. We show co-efficient estimates and t-statistics in separate columns. SPITEM = 
income-decreasing special items scaled by sales, REVT is total revenue scaled by total assets. REL = religiosity 
of the firms’ environment, BIG4 is an indicator variable that equals 1 if a firm is audited by the BIG4 auditing 
firm, otherwise zero. SPITEM×BIG4 = interaction between BIG4 auditors and total revenue by total assets. 
REVT×BIG4 = interaction between BIG4 and total revenue scaled by total assets. REL×SPITEM×BIG4 = 
interaction among religiosity, BIG4 auditors and income-decreasing special items. REL×REVT×BIG4 = 
interaction among religiosity, BIG4 auditors and total revenue scaled by total assets.  REL×BIG4 = interaction 
between BIG4 and religiosity. TEN = is the natural log of the number of years the auditor has been with the 
company. SPITEM×TEN = interaction between income-decreasing special items and auditor tenure. 
REVT×TEN = interaction between total revenue scaled by total assets and auditor tenure. REL×TEN = 
interaction between auditor tenure and religiosity. The parameters are estimated based on the following model: 
All variables are defined in appendix. 
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Table 11: Religiosity and Misclassification in Pre and Post Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
2000 and Financial Crises Period 
 
Dependent Variable = UNEXP_CE 
Variables  2000-2002  2003-2009  2010-2015  
 Coefficient t-values Coefficient t-values Coefficient t-values 
Intercept -0.05 -0.72 -0.08 -0.74 -0.04 -0.64 
SPITEM  0.32 4.52*** 0.21 2.48**  0.18 2.34** 
REVT  0.19 3.98*** 0.15 2.58**  0.12 2.18*** 
REL -0.26 -3.52*** -0.28  -3.68*** -0.27 -3.66*** 
REL×SPITEM -0.17 -3.64*** -0.22 -3.92*** -0.20 -3.87*** 
REL×REVT -0.07 -3.26*** -0.08 -3.47*** -0.09 -3.91*** 
SIZE -0.03 -1.32 -0.02 -1.13 -0.02 -1.12 
LEV  0.06 2.35** 0.05 2.33**  0.04 2.26** 
CASFO  0.04 1.28 0.03 1.18  0.03 1.16 
ROA -0.06  -2.36** -0.05  -2.29** -0.04  -2.18** 
MBV -0.01 -2.42** -0.04 -1.97** -0.06 -1.78* 
BIG4 -0.02 -1.49 -0.03 -1.22 -0.04 -1.28 
ANA_FOL -0.02 -1.63 -0.02 -1.46 -0.04 -1.44 
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3,054 3,054 10,828 10,828 9,281 9,281 
Adjusted R2 0.29 0.29 0.33 0.33 0.30 0.30 
Notes: We use *,**,*** in a two tailed test to respectively indicate statistical significance at 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 
percent levels. We show co-efficient estimates and t-statistics in separate columns. SPITEM = income-decreasing special items 
scaled by sales, REVT is total revenue scaled by total assets, REL = religiosity of the firms’ environment, REL×SPITEM = interaction between 
religiosity and income-decreasing special items. REL×REVT = interaction between religiosity and total revenue scaled by total assets. SIZE 
is the natural log of total assets, LEV is the financial leverage measured as the total debts scaled by total equity, CASFO is the cash flow from 
operational activities scaled by lagged total assets. ROA is measured as net income before extraordinary items divided by average total assets 
and MBV is measured as total assets divided by market capitalization. BIG4 is an indicator variable that equals 1 if a firm is audited by the 
BIG4, otherwise zero and ANLYST_FOL represents the natural log of the number of financial analyst following the firm. The parameters are 
estimated based on the following model: All variables are defined in appendix. 
UNEXP_CE = β0 + + β1 SPITEM + β2REL + β3 SPITEM × REL +β4 REVT + β5 REVT × REL + β6 SIZE + β7 
LEV + β8 CASFO + β9 ROA + β10 BMV + β11 BIG4 + β12 ANALYST_FOL        
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Table 12: Regressions of Religion on Classification Shifting Using Geographic 
Centralised and Dispersed Segments Sub-samples 
 
Centralised 
Segments 
 
Dispersed 
 Segments 
Variables Coefficient t-values  Coefficient t-values 
Intercept -0.07   -0.71  -0.04 -0.83 
SPITEM 0.06 2.96***  0.04 2.82*** 
REVT 0.13 3.35***  0.10 2.09** 
REL -0.18 -4.29***  -0.12 -1.53 
REL×SPITEM -0.16 -3.42***  -0.09 -1.48 
REL×REVT -0.12 -3.92***  -0.07 -1.32 
SIZE -0.06 -2.36**  -0.04 -2.43** 
LEV 0.19 1.41  0.03  1.56 
CASFO 0.19 1.49  0.13 1.48 
ROA -0.07 -1.78*  -0.08 -1.72* 
MBV -0.09  -2.18**  -0.03 -2.32** 
BIG4 -0.05 -1.02  -0.05 -1.09 
ANA_FOL -0.04 -1.32  -0.04 -1.27 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.38 0.38  0.32 0.32 
Observations 18623 18623  4541 4541 
Notes: We use *,**,*** in a two tailed test to respectively indicate statistical significance at 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent 
levels. We show co-efficient estimates and t-statistics in separate columns. SPITEM = income-decreasing special items scaled 
by sales, REVT is total revenue scaled by total assets. REL = religiosity of the firms’ environment, REL×SPITEM = interaction 
between religiosity and income-decreasing special items. REL× REVT = interaction between religiosity and total revenue 
scaled by total assets. SIZE is the natural log of total assets, LEV is the financial leverage measured as the total debts scaled 
by total equity, CASFO is the cash flow from operational activities scaled by lagged total assets. ROA is measured as net 
income before extraordinary items divided by average total assets and MBV is measured as total assets divided by market 
capitalization. BIG4 is an indicator variable that equals 1 if a firm is audited by the BIG4, otherwise zero and ANLYST_FOL 
represents the natural log of the number of financial analyst following the firm. The parameters are estimated based on the 
following model: All variables are defined in appendix. 
 
  UNEXP_CE = β0 + + β1 SPITEM + β2REL + β3 SPITEM × REL +β4 REVT + β5 REVT × REL + β6 SIZE + β7 
LEV + β8 CASFO + β9 ROA + β10 BMV + β11 BIG4 + β12 ANALYST_FOL
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     Table 13: Regressions of Religiosity on Classification Shifting using Centralised 
Segment Sub-Sample  
 
Dependent Variable = UNEXP_CE 
 Coefficient  t-value 
Intercept -0.07  -1.32 
SPITEM  0.06  2.82*** 
REVT  0.16  3.19*** 
REL -0.11  -3.27*** 
RELxSPITEM -0.13  -3.07*** 
RELxREVT -0.12  -3.47*** 
SIZE -0.02  -1.14 
LEV  0.10  1.63 
CASFO  0.03  0.84 
ROA -0.06  -1.17 
MBV -0.03  -1.75* 
Year Fixed Effects Yes  Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.32  0.32 
Observations 4541  4541 
 
Notes: We use *,**,*** in a two tailed test to respectively indicate statistical significance at 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent 
levels. We show co-efficient estimates and t-statistics in separate columns. SPITEM = income-decreasing special items scaled 
by sales, REVT is total revenue scaled by total assets. REL = religiosity of the firms’ environment, REL×SPITEM = interaction 
between religiosity and income-decreasing special items. REL× REVT = interaction between religiosity and total revenue 
scaled by total assets. SIZE is the natural log of total assets, LEV is the financial leverage measured as the total debts scaled 
by total equity, CASFO is the cash flow from operational activities scaled by lagged total assets. ROA is measured as net 
income before extraordinary items divided by average total assets and MBV is measured as total assets divided by market 
capitalization. BIG4 is an indicator variable that equals 1 if a firm is audited by the BIG4, otherwise zero and ANLYST_FOL 
represents the natural log of the number of financial analyst following the firm. The parameters are estimated based on the 
following model: All variables are defined in appendix. 
 
  UNEXP_CE = β0 + + β1 SPITEM + β2REL + β3 SPITEM × REL +β4 REVT + β5 REVT × REL + β6 SIZE + β7 
LEV + β8 CASFO + β9 ROA + β10 BMV + β11 BIG4 + β12 ANALYST_FO
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Table 14: Religiosity and Classification Shifting in Twenty US States 
 Coefficient  t-value 
Intercept      -0.06  -0.68 
SPITEM       0.06       2.98*** 
REVT       0.10      3.56*** 
REL      -0.12    -2.94** 
REL×SPITEM      -0.13       -4.02*** 
REL×REVT      -0.11    -2.89** 
SIZE      -0.05  -1.84* 
LEV       0.05  1.47 
CASFO       0.23      2.57** 
ROA      -0.09     -1.75* 
MBV      -0.07  -1.09 
BIG4      -0.03                 -1.42 
ANAL_FOL      -0.02  -1.33 
Year Fixed Effects Yes  Yes 
R-Square 0.49  0.49 
No. of Observations 12,325  12,325 
 
Notes: We use *,**,*** in a two tailed test to respectively indicate statistical significance at 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent 
levels. We show co-efficient estimates and t-statistics in separate columns. SPITEM = income-decreasing special items scaled 
by sales, REVT is total revenue scaled by total assets, REL = religiosity of the firms’ environment, REL×SPITEM 
= interaction between religiosity and income-decreasing special items. REL×REVT = interaction between religiosity and total 
revenue scaled by total assets. SIZE is the natural log of total assets, LEV is the financial leverage measured as the total debts 
scaled by total equity, CASFO is the cash flow from operational activities scaled by lagged total assets. ROA is measured as 
net income before extraordinary items divided by average total assets and MBV is measured as total assets divided by market 
capitalization. BIG4 is an indicator variable that equals 1 if a firm is audited by the BIG4, otherwise zero and ANLYST_FOL 
represents the natural log of the number of financial analyst following the firm. The parameters are estimated based on the 
following model: All variables are defined in appendix. 
UNEXP_CE = β0 + β1 SPITEM + β2 REL + β2 REL×SPITEM + β2 SIZE + β3 LEV + β4 
CASFO + β5 ROA + β6 MBV + β7 ROA + β8 MBV. 
 
 
 
                                                             
